The CANE response for active threats by the IFPO’s Chris Hertig

Violence in our society is attracting an increasing amount of media attention. It also gets attention in the law offices, human resources departments, security departments and first responder agencies. Violence is here to stay, and while a decidedly unappealing topic of conversation, it’s a conversation we must have. Terrorism isn’t going away and neither are the mentally unstable. Both of these factors are amplified by media coverage which brings attention to them and creates copycats -- arguably the single biggest factor in wanton violence.

Unfortunately, our traditional approach to active threats is grossly inappropriate. Backwards! A heart attack victim needs an AED and/or CPR within minutes in order to survive. A person facing violence needs help within seconds. The focus on police response for violence would be like looking to the ambulance or trauma center for help with cardiac arrest. It’s ill-conceived. It’s backwards. And it ignores the victim.

Active threats can take innumerable forms. They are any imminent danger posed by weapons, explosives, or the human body (hands, feet, heads, teeth, etc.). We obviously can’t prepare people for every contingency, but we can give them principles that are useful for most. Active threats are IMMEDIATE problems which must be solved. To do this, the defender needs to understand certain things.

First, responding to violence requires proper assessment and decision making. Factors of time and distance must be taken into account. Some folks have difficulty understanding them; especially if they haven’t experienced an assault or confronted an armed individual. The reactionary gap between seeing an assault and the time it takes to mount a defense is generally misunderstood. The bottom line being that it takes more time to defend than attack. The Force Science Institute has conducted research on reaction time and may be a good starting point in understanding time and distance.

The “CANE” acronym can be used to train and educate people regarding the best response to active threats. This includes employees, students, residents, etc.; but it should start with supervisors and security staff. The assumption that someone knows something due to rank or job title must never be made. All too often only more senior managers are given training in workplace violence. The line folks are often in the line of fire! They can’t be left unprepared.

CANE can be used in teaching people how to respond to an active threat by experienced, qualified instructors who have sufficient time and teaching resources. The instructors should not just be veteran law enforcement, security or military personnel, but should have a firm background in firearms tactics and defensive tactics. They must also have sufficient resources in terms of time and platforms so that the greatest amount of real learning can occur. The amount of learning and the need for reiteration demand this; especially as the topic is foreign to so many people (even men who think they know it all).

C – Cover (shielding) and Concealment (hiding). Ideally cover and concealment are used simultaneously. Hiding behind a solid wall or vehicle tire would be examples of an ideal that may not be possible. Cover includes objects (vehicles) or structures (walls) that shield one from bullets. Cover provides protection as it stops (prevents) or slows down (mitigates) bullets.

A general rule is to get behind something, anything, as it will at least partially slow down the bullets. But not glass as the glass will fragment and cause injury.

Cover from other types of active threats may include furniture located or placed between the assailant and defender. This works for attacks with clubs or knives. A chair overturned in the path of a knife wielder or getting behind the corner of a desk or table may provide momentary protection. The defender can distract the attacker to buy more time. Simply thinking about cover in workspaces should be encouraged. “Mental rehearsal” decreases response time as well as uncovers hazards and vulnerabilities.

Concealment includes anything which one can hide behind. If the attacker cannot see their intended victim, it’s difficult to attack effectively and mitigates the risk. If they do not initiate or continue the attack due to the target being concealed, the attack has been prevented.

A – Assess (from a position of cover and concealment). Seeing and understanding the threat is crucial to dealing with it. What is in the hands of the assailant? What type of weapon do they have? How are they dressed? How many adversaries are there? Are they carrying a bag or package that could contain additional ammunition or dangerous devices?

N – Notify. Alert the right people as quickly as possible. This may take the form of yelling to alert those nearby. The yelling could also utilize the employment of “hard verbals” such as “Stop! Stop! Stop!” at the attacker. These verbal commands serve several different purposes in that they may momentarily stop the assault as well as notify people in the immediate area. Hard verbals are particularly useful as a defensive measure (and good with parenting at times……).

Notification means calling the right people (police, security). In many active shooter cases calls were made to parents and friends before police. Communications should be practiced by everyone so that this does not occur. Communications training should contain practice in describing clearly what is transpiring. This includes persons (attackers), behaviors and weapons.

An astute employer can bundle a bit of the communications skills used with active threats in with other communications training. This makes the instruction more cost and time effective. It provides for some reiteration and can make routine classes more engaging.

E – Escape or Engage. Sneak away undetected if at all possible. “Stay low-stay small” is good to remember. It makes one a small target and may also aid in hiding/concealment. . Running away may make more sense even if seen by the assailant: a moving target is harder to hit and accuracy drops with distance. Unfortunately while running may be a good tactic, real world human behavior probably eliminates it as an option: if the assailant is close it may not work or even be thought of. A weapon displayed at a close range captures the defender’s focus so much that only the weapon is seen. Backing away is the initial response. Running won’t be the first thought and may not be the second or third. Finally, there may be nowhere to run to.

Engaging with or fighting an assailant may also be an option. If the assault is in progress it’s probably the only option. Fighting can be enhanced with hard verbals and distraction. Yell! Throw something at their eyes. Some simple tactics can buy time and are not difficult to learn.

Whether or not to fight is a decision that must be made promptly - and properly. A key consideration is distance from an adversary. If very close to a shooting assailant; grabbing and controlling the weapon would almost certainly be necessary. Many active shooters have been neutralized when bystanders tackled them while they were reloading or otherwise distracted. As the distance from the assailant increases; the viability of engagement declines. These are the issues that must be adequately covered in training.

Obviously protective service professionals have a greater duty to protect others, making engagement more likely for them than line employees or bystanders. This option must be weighed in terms of law and policy; as well as weapons, training and ability of the protector. Ultimately it’s a moral decision: how a police or security officer handles an active threat stays with them for the rest of their lives.

The preceding is far from everything one needs to stay safe but is a good starting point. Active threats aren’t going away. Addressing them logically, with an accurate knowledge base is essential. Spurious statistics and simplistic “solutions” do a disservice to all.

Chris Hertig is a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) and Certified Protection Officer Instructor (CPOI) with over 30 years experience teaching Use of Force, Defensive Tactics, Legal Aspects of Security, etc. The "Pester Professor" spent most of his career teaching college, but also served as a Nuclear Security Training Administrator and consultant. He has published extensively and is active in several professional organizations (ASIS, IFPO, ILEETA).